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NOTES
DRIVER v. HELMS AND THE LONG-ARM, STRONG-ARM
EFFECTS OF 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)
INTRODUCTION
In the past decade a significant jurisdictional problem has arisen in the
federal courts over the prosecution of federal officials for violations of the
constitutional rights of private citizens. A major cause of this problem is the
varying interpretations courts have given to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e),' passed as
part of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 (the Act).2 Although the Act
was originally proposed as a solution to the specific problems entailed in
bringing a mandamus action against a federal official, an increasing number
of plaintiffs are attempting to use its venue provisions in non-mandamus
actions for money damages. 3 To facilitate these actions, plaintiffs are also
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1976) provides: "A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or
employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color
of legal authority, or an agency of the United States, or the United States, may, except as
otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judicial district in which (1) a defendant in the
action resides, or (2) the cause of action arose, or (3) any real property involved in the action is
situated, or (4) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action. Additional
persons may be joined as parties to any such action in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and with such other venue requirements as would be applicable if the United States or
one of its officers, employees, or agencies were not a party.
"The summons and complaint in such an action shall be served as provided by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure except that the delivery of the summons and complaint to the officer or
agency as required by the rules may be made by certified mail beyond the territorial limits of the
district in which the action is brought." The section contains extremely broad venue provisions,
as opposed to § 1391(b), which limits venue to the district where all the defendants reside or
where the claim arises. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1976). Service of process is also made easier, in that
service by certified mail is sufficient; the usual method of service on a government official is by
service both upon the government agency and personally upon the officer. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(S).
Moreover, unless a statute provides otherwise, service is generally limited to the boundaries of the
state in which the district court sits. Id. 4(f). Section 1391(e), therefore, modifies the venue and
service requirements so that an official of the federal government can be sued locally, rather than
only at his residence in the District of Columbia. See notes 7-13 infra and accompanying text.
2. Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-748, 76 Stat. 744 (codified, as
amended, at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1391(e) (1976)).
3. See pt. I infra. Many of these plaintiffs have sued for alleged violations of their
constitutional rights resulting from the wiretapping and mail intercept operations conducted by
agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
Under the mail intercept program, originated in 1950, all mail between the United States and any
Communist country was funnelled, at various times, through New York City, San Francisco,
New Orleans, or Hawaii. The Nelson Rockefeller Report to the President by the Commission on
CIA Activities 101 (Manor Book ed. June 1975). At first, the program was limited to surveying
and selectively photographing the covers of all such letters. Id. at 103. By 1959, however, the
East Coast intercept program, based in New York City, was opening about 30,000 letters per
year chosen on the basis of a "watch list" of suspect organizations and individuals supplied in part
by the FBI. Id. at 105, 111. In its last full year of operation, the East Coast program handled
4,350,000 letters; the covers of 2,300,000 of these were photographed and 8,700 letters were
actually opened. Id. at 111. Amazingly enough, CIA records show that almost 2,000,000 separate
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
asserting that the nationwide service of process provision of section 1391(e)
inherently empowers district courts to assert personal jurisdiction over the
defendant federal officials. 4 Unfortunately, resolution of the propriety of these
attempts5 is clouded by an ambiguous and often self-contradictory legislative
entries in the computerized information system resulted from the mail opening operation
between 1955 and 1973, the year the program was terminated. Id. at 112. Meanwhile, the FBI
was also conducting illegal operations. See The Center for National Securities Studies, The
Abuses of the Intelligence Agencies (J. Berman & M. Halperin ed. 1975). Until 1966, when they
were supposedly discontinued, burglaries committed by the FBI upon individuals, groups, and
several embassies averaged about 100 per year. Id. at 21-22. As of March 1, 1973, FBI files
contained approximately 6,426,813 "intelligence and . . investigation" files on United States
citizens and groups. Id. Moreover, between 1969 and 1974, FBI wiretap installations averaged
well over 100 per year. Id. at 34.
4. See note 14 infra and accompanying text.
5. One of the earliest debates surrounding the scope of § 1391(e) was whether its provisions
applied in suits against defendants who were no longer in government service. By definition, the
section pertains to: "[a] civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United
States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1976)
(emphasis added). Because all the verbs are in the present tense, the First Circuit has interpreted
the statute, according to the plain meaning rule of statutory interpretation, to apply only to
officials in government service at the time the action is initiated. Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147,
150 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nom. Colby v. Driver, 99 S. Ct. 1015 (1979) (No. 78-303);
see Blackburn v. Goodwin, No. 78-7592, slip op. at 4669 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1979). The plain
meaning rule allows that "[w]here the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning
the duty of interpretation does not arise and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no
discussion . . . ." Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). However, If such a
reading results in a meaning which is absurd or "plainly at variance with the policy of the
legislation as a whole," then the court must go beyond the plain meaning of the words of the
statute and search out the legislative intent. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922);
see Massachusetts Financial Servs., Inc. v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 545 F.2d 754,
756 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 904 (1977). Des.pite the fact that the First Circuit found
§ 1391(e) to be unambiguous, it nevertheless delved into an examination of the legislative history.
The court found nothing in this history from which it could be inferred that the section was ever
intended to reach former officials. Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d at 150-51; see Kipperman v.
McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Wu v. Keeney, 384 F. Supp. 1161, 1168 (D.D.C.
1974), aff'd, 527 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See generally H.R. Rep. No. 536, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1961) [hereinafter cited as House Report]; S. Rep. No. 1992, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962),
reprinted in [1962] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2784 [hereinafter cited as Senate Report].
Several courts, however, have come to an opposite conclusion based on public policy considera-
tions. United States v. McAninch, 435 F. Supp. 240, 245 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Lowensteln v.
Rooney, 401 F. Supp. 952, 962 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); see Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382, 398-400
(D.R.I. 1977), modified, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), cer. granted sub nom. Colby v. Driver, 99
S. Ct. 1015 (1979) (No. 78-303). These courts contend that if former officials were not Included
under § 1391(e), the officials could escape the broadened venue provisions of the section by
resignation and force plaintiffs to sue them as private citizens under the general venue statutes,
thereby resulting in greater litigation expense and a multiplicity of suits. Id. at 399; see note 67
infra.
The general rule, however, seems to be that § 1391(e) cannot be used as a method of gaining
venue and jurisdiction over former officials. See, e.g., Lamont v. Haig, 590 F.2d 1124, 1131
(D.C. Cir. 1978); Relf v. Gasch, 511 F.2d 804, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Kipperman v. McCone, 422
F. Supp. 860, 876 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Wu v. Keeney, 384 F. Supp. 1161, 1168 (D.D.C. 1974),
aff'd, 527 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In addition to the plain meaning of the statute, this position
1979] 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) 85
history6 which fails to delineate clearly the statute's intended scope.
is bolstered by the 1976 amendment to § 1391(e). Act of Oct. 21, 1976, § 3. Pub. L. No. 94-574,
90 Stat. 2721 (1976). This amendment was designed to eliminate the "whipsaw effect" which
several defendants had interposed as a means of avoiding § 1391(e)'s jurisdiction. This ploy
consisted of joining a non-federal defendant in an action under § 1391(e). Because the statute
applied only when "each defendant" was a federal official, joinder of a non-federal defendant
defeated application of the section. Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. Department of Hous.
& Urban Dev., 284 F. Supp. 809, 833 & n.14 (E.D.Pa. 1968). Although the Powelton court and
others had already rejected this artifice, id. at 833-34; see Liberation News Serv. v. Eastland, 426
F.2d 1379, 1382 n.5 (2d Cir. 1970), Congress amended the statute to read "a defendant" in order
to make it clear that such a device would no longer work. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, § 3, Pub. L. No.
94-574, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976). The amendment also provided that additional, non-federal defen-
dants could be brought into such actions under the general venue and service rules. Id.; see note
1 supra. Therefore, because the former officials are now considered "non-federal defendants,"
they come within the provisions of the statute requiring application of the general rules. See
Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 149 n.6, 150 n. 10 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nom. Colby v.
Driver, 99 S. Ct. 1015 (1979) (No. 78-303). There is no doubt that these former officials are still
liable for their actions, see Halperin v. Kissinger, 424 F. Supp. 838 (D.D.C. 1976), but they are
no longer subject to the venue and service of process provisions of § 1391(e), which could subject
them to suit anywhere in the country. 577 F.2d at 150; Driver v. Helms. 74 F.R.D. 382, 400
(D.R.I. 1977), modified, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub non. Colby v. Driver, 99
S. Ct. 1015 (1979) (No. 78-303). It is interesting to note that the Driver court also held that
"§ 1391(e) does not apply to those defendants who, at the time this action was brought, were not
serving the government in the capacity in which they performed the acts on which their alleged
liability is based." 577 F.2d at 151 (footnote omitted). However, Driver specifically did not decide
whether someone promoted within the same department was still liable under the provisions of
§ 1391(e). Id. at n. 11; see Blackburn v. Goodwin, No. 78-7592, slip op. at 4669 (2d Cir. Sept. 10,
1979). Another factor in the argument against the application of § 1391(e) to former officials is
Congress' expressed intention that "[tlhis bill is not intended to give access to the Federal courts to
an action which cannot now be brought against a Federal official in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia." House Report, supra, at 2. Because retired officials living outside
Washington, D.C. were not subject to suit in the district court for the District of Columbia
at the time the statute was passed, it would follow that former officials were not intended to be
within the ambit of §1391(e). Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d at 150 n.10. Finally, while denials of
certiorari have no precedential value, it is interesting to note that in the mail opening litigation
certiorari has been granted in the two cases involving petitions by present officials for a review of
the circuit court's decision, Colby v. Driver, No. 78-303, and Stafford v. Briggs, No. 77-1546, see
99 S. Ct. 1015 (1979), while certiorari has been denied in the two cases challenging the decision to
exclude former officials from the application of § 1391(e), Driver v. Helms, No. 78-310, and
Helms v. Driver, No. 78-311, see 99 S. Ct. 1016 (1979).
6. The contradictory nature of the virtually identical House and Senate reports is highlighted
by an examination of several of their passages. The House Report states that "[tihis bill is directed
primarily at facilitating review by the Federal courts of administrative actions." House Report,
supra note 5, at 1. Such a statement seems strictly to contemplate mandamus actions. Likewise,
the Senate Report states: "This bill will not give access to the Federal courts to an action which
cannot now be brought against a Federal official in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia." Senate Report, supra note 5, at 2, reprinted in [1962] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
at 2785. This statement also seems to restrict the Act to mandamus actions, which had
historically been limited to the District of Columbia. See note 7 infra and accompanying text. The
House Report notes at a later point, however, that "[problems) also arise.. . in an action against a
Government official seeking damages from him for actions which are claimed to be without legal
authority but which were taken by the official in the course of performing his duty." House
Report, supra note 5, at 3. Therefore, Congress seems to be restricting § 1391(e) to mandamus
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Prior to the passage of the Act a plaintiff seeking to compel action by a local
federal official could do so only by obtaining a writ of mandamus in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia.7 As a result, the
plaintiff had to bear the expense of transporting himself, his witnesses and his
evidence to Washington, D.C., as well as the expense of hiring additional
local counsel.8 The Act, therefore, empowered all federal district courts to
hear and determine actions "in the nature of mandamus" against federal
officials. 9 To implement this section, Congress also added section 1391(e) to
the general venue statute' 0 to provide that, where no real property is involved
actions while at the same time indicating an intent to apply the section to money damage actions.
These apparent contradictions are due in part to the discussion of two separate statutes in a single
report. Once this is taken into account and the divergent nature of the reports is considered, the
conflicts resolve themselves. See note 25 infra and accompanying text.
7. This historical accident was the result of two early Supreme Court cases. In M'Intire v.
Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504 (1813), which involved an action brought in an Ohio federal court
to mandamus the register of the local land office, the Court held that Congress simply had not
delegated the power of mandamus to the lower federal courts. Id. at 506. The harshness of this
decision was lessened somewhat in Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524
(1838), in which the Court held that the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
had the power to issue such writs. This power was found to exist because, in addition to being a
federal court, the district court was also chargejd with the enforcement of the laws of Maryland,
which had traditionally granted lower courts the power to mandamus government officials. Id. at
622-24; see House Report, supra note 5, at 2; Senate Report, supra note 5, at 2, reprinted in (1962]
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2784-85. See genera~ly Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the
Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of Federal Administrative
Action, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 308-13 (1967). At the time the Act was passed, the need for local
mandamus actions against federal officials usually arose because of land disputes. Liberation
News Serv. v. Eastland, 426 F.2d 1379, 1383 (2d Cir. 1970). In general, these disputes arose In
the western states, where the federal government was a large landowner. Because the plaintiff
could only obtain a writ of mandamus in the district court in Washington, D.C., he was forced to
travel across the country to assert his claim. In addition to the inconvenience and expense to such
a plaintiff, the caseload in the District of Columbia district court became congested because of the
number of mandamus actions funnelled into that court. House Report, supra note 5, at 3; Senate
Report, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in [1962] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2786. See also
Byse & Fiocca, supra, at 313-18. Prior to the Act, some plaintiffs attempted to circumvent the
jurisdictional problem by disguising their mandamus suits in the form of suits for mandatory
injunctions. These actions failed, however, because the chief officer of the federal agency,
stationed in Washington, D.C. and usually deemed by statute to be an indispensible party, was
beyond the reach of process of any federal court other than the district court for the District of
Columbia. See Blackburn v. Goodwin, No. 78-7592, slip op. at 4661-62 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1979);
Liberation News Serv. v. Eastland, 426 F.2d 1379, 1383 (2d Cir. 1970); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
Therefore even if the plaintiff were successful in disguising the action it would still fail in the local
court. See id. 19.
8. Hearings on H.R. 10089 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary (Subcomm. No. 4), 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4 (May 26 & June 2, 1960) [hereinafter cited as Hearings] (statement of Rep.
Budge). These unpublished hearings concerning the draft version of § 1391(e) were made
available by counsel to, and were relied upon by, the court in Driver. Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d
147, 152 n.16 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nom. Colby v. Driver, 99 S. Ct. 1015 (1979) (No.
78-303). Prior cases had not even hinted at their existence.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976) provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or
any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff."
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1976); see note 1 supra.
1979] 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)
in the action, 1 venue is proper in the district where the plaintiff resides, 12
and that the district court may deliver its process nationwide by certified
mail. 1
3
The most recent case interpreting the scope of section 1391(e), Driver v.
Helms,14 has come down with a holding contrary to the prevailing view on
the money damage issue as enunciated by the Second Circuit. In Driver, the
First Circuit held that the section was in fact applicable in actions for money
damages.' s On the issue of personal jurisdiction, however, the First Circuit
followed the conventional analysis, holding that section 1391(e), like all other
nationwide service of process statutes, confers personal jurisdiction on the
district court issuing the process. 16 While the First Circuit's position on the
money damage issue is a more accurate analysis of the congressional intent
behind section 1391(e) than the heretofore prevailing view, its interpretation
of the jurisdictional issue is conclusory at best and overlooks critical distinc-
tions between section 1391(e) and the remaining nationwide service of process
statutes.
I. MoNEY DAMAGES AGAINST FEDERAL OFFICIALS
IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES
The threshold issue facing the Driver court was whether section 1391(e) is
applicable in actions against federal officials in their individual capacities for
money damages. 1 7 The necessity of suing federal officials in their individual
capacity for actions taken "under color of legal authority" rather than
bringing a direct suit against the United States eo nomine arose because of
11. This Note will focus exclusively on factual situations similar to the wiretapping and mail
opening cases. All analysis, therefore, will assume that no real property is involved in the action,
thereby permitting venue wherever the plaintiff resides. See note I supra.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(4) (1976).
13. Id.; see note 69 intfra and accompanying text.
14. 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nona. Colby v. Driver, 99 S. Ct. 101s
(1979) (No. 78-303). In Driver, the plaintiff filed a class action suit in the federal district court for
the district of Rhode Island against twenty-five present and former federal officials, in their
official capacities for injunctive and declaratory relief and in their individual capacities for
money damages, for the officials' participation in alleged mail openings which had taken place in
New York City. 577 F.2d at 148-149. Because the mail openings did not take place in Rhode
Island and because only the plaintiff resided within that state, id. at 149 nn.2, 3, venue would not
have been proper under the general federal venue provisions. Id. at 149; see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)
(1976). Moreover, because the defendants were served by certified mail beyond the territorial
limits of Rhode Island, service was improper under the general service provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 577 F.2d at 149. Rule 4(f), which would govern in this situation absent
the presence of § 1391(e), provides that process must be served "anywhere within the territorial
limits of the state in which the district court is held" unless another statute authorizes service
beyond the state boundaries. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f). The basis for using § 1391(e) was that one of
the plaintiffs, Driver, resided in Rhode Island. This triggered the statute and consequently
broadened venue and service of process. 577 F.2d at 149; see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(4) (1976).
15. 577 F.2d at 151-54; see pt. I infra.
16. 577 F.2d at 154-57; see pt. II infra. Although the defendants in Driver argued that they
lacked minimum contacts with Rhode Island, the court held that federal jurisdiction was based
not upon state lines, but upon contacts with the United States. 577 F.2d at 156; see note 92 infra
and accompanying text.
17. 577 F.2d at 151-54.
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the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the legal fiction developed in Ex
parte Young18 to circumvent it. 19 The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars
actions directly against the United States unless the federal government is
found to have expressly waived its immunity by statute. 20 The Young court
determined that "[i]f the act which the [official] seeks to enforce be a violation
of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment
comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is
in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected
in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct."'2 1 Despite the fact
that this legal fiction dictated by Young results in roundabout suits, it is the
only method by which plaintiffs may sue the United States for such acts until
the mantle of sovereign immunity is relinquished. 22
Had Congress limited section 1391(e) to actions taken by federal officials in
their official capacity, there would be little question that the statute was
meant to apply only in mandamus actions.2 3 Congress, however, recognized
the necessity of bringing suit under the Young fiction when it included acts
performed "under color of legal authority" within the purview of section
1391(e). 24 On its face, this language conflicts with the theory adhered to by
18. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
19. Although the decision in Young applied only to state officials, it was subsequently found
to apply in cases requesting money damages from both state, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961), overruled in part, Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and federal
officials. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
20. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S.
584, 586 (1941); United States v. Thompson, 98 U.S. 486, 489 (1878). The Supreme Court has
recently stressed that this waiver must be express and will not be implied. United States v.
Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976). Moreover, it has been held that wiretapping and mall opening
violations are not among the waivers present in the Federal Tort Claims Act. See Kipperman v.
McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860, 867-70 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
21. 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
22. Hearings, supra note 8, at 91-93 (statement of Judge Mars).
23. See Blackburn v. Goodwin, No. 78-7592, slip op. at 4663 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1979);
Hearings, supra note 8, at 32 (statement of Mr. Drablkin).
24. H.R. Rep. No. 1936, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1960). The predecessor bill, H.R. 10089,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), to the bill finally enacted as § 1391(e), applied only to the official acts
of a federal officer. Because most suits are brought against the official in his individual capacity, a
statute worded only to include official acts would not serve any useful purpose. Consequently, the
statute was amended, on the advice of the Justice Department, to include acts taken "under color
of legal authority." H.R. Rep. No. 1936, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-8 (1960). This revision would
therefore seem to prove that Congress was aware of the necessity of bringing the action against
the official in his individual capacity, and authorized such suits by its amendment, See Jacoby,
The- Effect of Recent Changes in the Law of 'Wonstatutory" Judicial Review, 53 Geo. L.J. 19,
33-37 (1964). "[UJnder color of legal authority" is defined by the House as follows: "By including
the officer or employee, both in his official capacity and acting under color of legal authority, the
committee intends to make the proposed section 1391(e) applicable not only to those cases where
an action may be brought against an officer or an employee in his official capacity. It Intends to
include also those cases where the action is nominally brought against the officer in his individual
capacity even though he was acting within the apparent scope of his authority and not as a
private citizen. Such actions are also in essence against the United States but are brought against
the officer or employee as individual only to circumvent what remains of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. The considerations of policy which demand that an action against an official may be
1979] 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)
the Second Circuit that the statute provides venue solely in suits for man-
damus and is strictly a companion to section 1361's grant of mandamus
subject matter jurisdiction to the federal courts. 25
The Second Circuit based its view upon the theory that the mandamus and
venue provisions, having been passed simultaneously, must be read to-
gether.26 Isolated sections of the legislative reports tend to confirm this
position. Congress had stated that the purpose of the venue provision "is
similar to that of section 1 [the mandamus section]. It is designed to permit an
action which is essentially against the United States to be brought locally"
rather than in the district court for the District of Columbia.2 7 From this
statement, the argument can be made that any action against a federal official
in his individual capacity is not "in essence" against the United States, and
therefore does not fall within the statute's scope.28 The declaration that the
brought locally rather than in the District of Columbia require similar venue provisions where the
action is based upon the fiction that the officer is acting as an individual. There is no intention,
however, to alter the venue requirements of Federal law insofar as suits resulting from the
official's private actions are concerned." House Report, supra note 5, at 3-4.
25. Blackburn v. Goodwin, No. 78-7592, slip op. at 4660 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1979); Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. TVA, 459 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1972); see Relf v. Gasch,
511 F.2d 804, 807 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Liberation News Serv. v. Eastland, 426 F.2d 1379,
1383 (2d Cir. 1970); Kenyatta v. Kelley, 430 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Davis v. FDIC, 369
F. Supp. 277, 279 (D. Colo. 1974); Paley v. Wolk, 262 F. Supp. 640, 643 (N.D. Ill 1965), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 963 (1967). In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. TVA, 459 F.2d 255
(2d Cir. 1972), the Second Circuit held that because the House and Senate reports emphasized the
legal anomaly which necessitated the creation of a statute dealing with mandamus and venue, the
sole congressional intent behind the enactment of § 1391(e) must have been to supply venue
in mandamus actions arising under § 1361. Id. at 258; see Liberation News Serv. v. Eastland,
426 F.2d 1379, 1383 (2d Cir. 1970). In fact, the beginning portions of both the House and Senate
reports were devoted to an explanation of the "historic accident" and the manner in which the Act
rectified it. See House Report, supra note 5, at 2; Senate Report, supra note 5, at 2, reprinted in
[1962] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2785. The reports, however, proceeded beyond man-
damus and discussed venue against federal officials in general. Id. In both Natural Resources and
Liberation News, the Second Circuit read the reports as entireties, without recognizing that the
congressional discussion had gone off on a tangent concerning venue in general. Thus, the Second
Circuit's view was based on the theory that Congress had created the statute only to solve the
mandamus problem. This position was recently reinforced by the Second Circuit in Blackburn v.
Goodwin, No. 78-7592 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1979). See note 28 intfra.
26. Blackburn v. Goodwin, No. 78-7592, slip op. at 4660 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1979); Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. TVA, 459 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1972).
27. House Report, supra note 5, at 2.
28. Blackburn v. Goodwin, No. 78-7592, slip op. at 4663 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1979); see
Hearings, supra note 8, at 54 (statement of Mr. MacGuineas). In Blackburn, the most recent case
interpreting § 1391(e), the Second Circuit went beyond its previous interpretation that §§ 1391(e)
and 1361 were meant to be read together and held that such money damage actions are not "in
essence" against the United States. Slip op. at 4662-63. Quoting Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731,
738 (1947), the court defined an action to be in essence against the sovereign if "Itlhe 'essential
nature and effect of the proceeding' may be such as to make plain that the judgment sought
would expend itself on the public treasury or domain or interfere with the public administration."
Slip op. at 4663. Because an adverse judgment in Blackburn would have to be paid by the
defendant rather than the United States, the Second Circuit held that the money damage action
was not within the scope of § 1391(e). Id. at 4662-63. But see Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 154
(1st Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nom. Colby v. Driver, 99 S. Ct. 1015 (1979) (No. 78-303); Briggs
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Act was intended to "facilitate review by the Federal courts of administrative
actions"'29 is further evidence that Congress contemplated that section 1391(e)
was to be applicable only when the subject matter of the suit was in the
nature of mandamus. 30
The First Circuit, however, reached the opposite conclusion based upon
equally sound, and perhaps more persuasive, authority. Section 1391(e) is
applicable in "a civil action," the only prerequisite being that "a defendant" is
a federal official. 31 Both the district and circuit courts in Driver chose to
follow the plain meaning of the statute, 32 while at the same time reading the
v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 1, 3 n.15, 6-7 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. granted sub nor. Stafford v. Brlggs,
99 S. Ct. 1015 (1979) (No. 77-1546); Lowenstein v. Rooney, 401 F. Supp. 952, 962 (E.D.N.Y.
1975) (individual actions brought against federal officials are in essence against the United States).
29. Senate Report, supra note 5, at 2, reprinted in 11962] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
2785; see House Report, supra note 5, at 1. The general statute for review of administrative
decisions, the Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, §§ 1-12, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.), has been held not to constitute a waiver of soverign immunity for
actions against the United States based upon conduct such as illegal wiretapping. See Kipperman
v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860, 869-70 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
30. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. TVA, 459 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1972). In
Natural Resources, the Second Circuit chastised the lower court for merely parsing the words of
the text without considering the relevant history. 459 F.2d at 257. The appellate court, quoting
Mr. Justice Frankfurter at length, bypassed the strict meaning of the language of the statute and
delved into the legislative history. Id.; see United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 199 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J.) ("[Ince the tyranny of literalness is rejected, all relevant considerations for
giving a rational content to the words becomes operative [and a] restrictive meaning for what
appear to be plain words may be indicated by the Act as a whole, [or] by the persuasive gloss of
legislative history. . . ."). Justice Frankfurter's view that the words of a statute "acquire scope
and function from the history of events which they summarize," Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,
313 U.S. 177, 186 (1941), and that "[tlhe starting point for determining legislative purpose is plainly
an appreciation of the 'mischief' that Congress was seeking to alleviate," ICC v. J-T Transp. Co,,
368 U.S. 81, 107 (1961) (dissenting opinion), had been used in Liberation News to arrive at
basically the same result as Natural Resources. See Liberation News Serv. v, Eastland, 426 F.2d
1379, 1383 (2d Cir. 1970). Because Congress stated that "[tihis bill is not intended to give access
to the Federal courts to an action which cannot now be brought against a Federal official in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia," House Report, supra note 5, at 2, and that
"[tihe purpose of this bill is to make it possible to bring actions against Government officials and
agencies in U.S. district courts outside the District of Columbia, which, because of certain
existing limitations on jurisdiction and venue, may now be brought only in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia," id. at 1, the Second Circuit concluded that there was no
intention to include actions against officials in their individual capacities under the Act. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. TVA, 459 F.2d at 258.
31. The courts which have chosen to deemphasize the actual words of the statute ignore the
fact that "(i]f Congress wanted to limit the application of § 1391(e) to mandamus actions, the
statutory language it chose was extraordinarily ill-fitted to (the] task" of so limiting the statute's
scope. Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382, 393 (D.R.I. 1977), modified, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir.
1978), cert. granted sub nom. Colby v. Driver, 99 S. Ct. 1015 (1979) (No. 78-303). Moreover,
"Congress has demonstrated its ample ability to distinguish between civil actions in general and
mandamus actions in particular, and this Court believes that the legislative history contradicting
the plain meaning of the subsection would have to be unusually clear and persuasive to warrant
adoption of a reading which a) is opposed to the plain meaning of the words of the subsection,
and b) attributes such carelessness to Congress." Id.
32. Id.; 577 F.2d at 151-52.
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House and Senate reports much more expansively than the Second Circuit
had.33 Despite the fact that the primary reason for the enactment of the
Mandamus and Venue Act was to rectify the historical accident regarding
mandamus actions, 34 the scope of section 1391(e) goes far beyond that of
being a mere companion to section 1361. While section 1391(e) was intended
to aid in the application of section 1361, it would appear that it was also
intended to stand by itself and be used according to its own terms.35
According to the Driver view, there is a definite indication in the legislative
history that Congress intended to apply section 1391(e) to actions for money
damages against officials in their individual capacities. The trial court in
Driver approached both the House and Senate reports as being divided into
two distinct areas-one portion concerned strictly with mandamus and a
second portion concerned strictly with venue. 36 This method of analysis
differs from the approach taken by the Second Circuit, which viewed each
report as an entirety. 37 The addition of an expanded venue provision was far
more than a mere complement to section 1361; it was a necessity. Without it,
all cases against federal officials would be mired in the District Court for the
District of Columbia. 38 This relationship, however, should not be used to
limit the effectiveness of section 1391(e) in non-mandamus actions. The fact
that a statute is created in order to aid in the implementation of another
section does not automatically preclude its use in other areas. 39 This is
especially true when, as in this situation, the statutes are titled separately and
placed without reference to one another in different sections of title 28.
Certainly Congress would have had the foresight to link the two statutes
indivisibly if it intended them to be read together. Moreover, in light of
historical facts first analyzed in Driver,40 a far broader purpose behind the
passage of the venue statute than that accorded it by the Second Circuit
would seem appropriate.
Perhaps the single most important statement in both the House and Senate
reports regarding the money damage question is that "[t]he venue problem
also arises in an action against a Government official seeking damages from
him for actions which are claimed to be without legal authority but which
were taken by the official in the course of performing his duty. 1 4' To reconcile
33. See 577 F.2d at 151-54; note 25 supra and accompanying text.
34. See notes 7, 25 supra.
35. Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Need for Statutory
Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68 Mich. L.
Rev. 387, 453-55 (1970); Jacoby, supra note 24, at 36-37. Both articles state that § 1391(e) is a
much broader venue provision, not merely a companion to § 1361, and is intended to apply to
any civil action. The district court in Driver gave particular weight to the opinion of Dean
Cramton because of the major role he played in the revisions of § 1391(e). 74 F.R.D. at 394 n. 10.
36. 74 F.R.D. at 392.
37. See note 25 supra.
38. Hearings, supra note 8, at 24-25 (statement of Judge Maris); see House Report, supra note
5, at 3; Senate Report, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in [1962] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
2786.
39. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
40. See note 8 supra.
41. House Report, supra note 5, at 3 (emphasis added); Senate Report, supra note 5, at 3,
reprinted in [1962] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2786.
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this statement with the Second Circuit view, one would have to argue that
Congress was completely unaware of the necessity of bringing suit under the
Ex parte Young doctrine, 42 which clearly was not the case:43
By including the officer or employee, both in his official capacity and acting under
color of legal authority, the committee intends to make the proposed section 1391(e)
applicable not only to those cases where an action may be brought against an officer or
employee in his official capacity. It intends to include also those cases where the action
is nominally brought against the officer in his individual capacity even though he was
acting within the apparent scope of his authority and not as a private citizen. Such
actions are also in essence against the United States but are brought against the officer
or employee as individual only to circumvent what remains of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.
4 4
The two legislative reports, which are virtually identical, 45 are best analyzed
by separating the initial paragraphs dealing with the historical background on
mandamus from the remainder of the reports. Such a separation is logical given
Congress' awareness of the possibility of money damages in suits against federal
officials.46 The non-background portions of the reports, while concerned
specifically with venue in mandamus actions, also address the broader issue of
venue in civil actions against federal officials. Indeed, the reports note that "[tihe
committee is of the view that the current state of the law regpecting venue in
actions against Government officials is contrary to the sound and equitable
administration of justice."'47 Once the historical background is put in its proper
place, it seems to follow that Congress was more concerned with reducing
caseloads in the District of Columbia 48 and making the judicial process more
efficient and convenient for citizens to sue government officials than with solely
providing a means for citizens to obtain writs of mandamus. 49
There are several other clear indications that Congress was aware of the
possible, even probable, implications of section 1391(e). The most formidable
is a letter written by then-Deputy Attorney General Byron R. White to the
Senate Judiciary Committee expressing the Justice Department's reservations
42. See notes 18-22 supra and accompanying text.
43. Hearings, supra note 8, at 32-33 (statement of Mr. MacGuineas apprising the committee
of the existence of the Ex parte Young doctrine); see note 24 supra.
44. House Report, supra note 5, at 3-4; see Jacoby, supra note 24, at 33.
45. Compare House Report, supra note 5, with Senate Report, supra note 5, reprinted in
[1962] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2784.
46. Hearings, supra note 8, at 32-33, 62 (statements of Mr. MacGuineas); see Senate Report,
supra note 5, at 6, reprinted in (1962] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2789; notes 50-56 illfra.
47. House Report, supra note 5, at 3; Senate Report, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in [1962J
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2786.
48. See House Report, supra note 5, at 3; Senate Report, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in
[1962] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2786. Because most actions against federal officials were
funnelled into the district court for the District of Columbia due to the venue rules and the
doctrine of indispensible parties, that court soon became overburdened. Id.; see note 7 supra.
49. House Report, supra note 5, at 3; Senate Report, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in [1962]
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2786. Because most suit; are based on acts performed by local
federal officials, it makes sense to bring the action in the district where the court Is more fully
aware of the circumstances. Id.; see Cramton, supra note 35, at 452-455.
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concerning the possible applications of section 1391(e).50 This letter charac-
terized the venue portion of the bill as covering "an entirely different subject"
than the mandamus portion. 5 ' White suggested placing the mandamus and
venue provisions within the Administrative Procedure Act.5 2 The effect of
this recommendation would have been to limit the venue provisions to
administrative acts, thereby "unquestionably eliminatfing] suits for money
judgments against officers." '5 3 Despite the fact that Congress incorporated
other of White's suggestions into the final draft,54 it failed to take any steps
to limit the scope of section 1391(e).-5 Thus it appears that Congress, fully
aware of the potential use of section 1391(e) in actions against federal officials
in their individual capacities for money damages, did nothing to correct this
supposed flaw.5 6
In addition, unpublished hearings, the existence of which was revealed in
Driver,-7 concerning the first draft of section 1391(e) also indicate that
Congress intended that the statute apply to money damage suits.58 These
hearings resulted in the first version of section 1391(e) containing the "under
color of legal authority" language.5 9 The indication was that only private
50. Senate Report, supra note 5, at 5-7, reprinted in [1962] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
2788-90.
51. Id. at 6, reprinted in [1962] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2789.
52. Id. The purpose of this suggestion was to require that all administrative remedies be
exhausted before an appeal to a court was allowed and to avoid any separation-of-powers
problems by eliminating any future question as to whether a discretionary executive act could be
reviewed by the judiciary. Id.
53. Id.
54. Congress adopted the Department's suggestion that § 1361 be limited to actions which
would compel an officer to carry out a duty owed to the plaintiff. Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147,
153 & n.20 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub non. Colby v. Driver, 99 S. Ct. 1015 (1979) (No.
78-303).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 152-53.
57. See note 14 supra.
58. Hearings, supra note 8, at 53-54 (statements of Reps. Dowdy & Whitener). The hearings,
however, also show a general confusion among the committee members as to the purposes of the
statute. At one point, Rep. Dowdy and judge Maris seemed to definitely rule out money
damages. Id. at 87; however, prior to this discussion, the committee had considered a hypotheti-
cal dealing with libel and slander perpetrated by a Congressman upon a private citizen. In such a
case, money damages would be the obvious remedy, yet this inconsistency was never discussed.
Id. at 55. On another occasion, Mr. MacGuineas of the justice Department stated that in order to
form an opinion, the Department had to "know how this bill is intended to affect each particular
type of suit that a citizen may want to bring against a Government official, and there are many
different types." Rep. Dowdy replied: "Maybe we want it to apply to all suits . . We want it to
apply to any one." Rep. Whitener added: "I did not understand there was any doubt." Id. at
53-54. Part of this confusion stems from the fact that the original bill was drawn only to affect
federal officers in their official capacities. Eventually, the justice Department apprised the
committee that because of the Ex path Young doctrine very few suits were brought directly
against the government officer in his official capacity. Most were brought against the official in
his individual capacity. This revelation prompted the inclusion of the -under color of legal
authority" language. Id. at 32-35, 91.
59. Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 153 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nor. Colby v.
Driver, 99 S. CL 1015 (1979) (No. 78-303). "The desire to reach a variety of causes of action
prompted the first mention of the 'under color of legal authority' phrase." Id. Several examples
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actions, completely without the scope of official business, were intended to be
excluded from the ambit of section 1391(e). 60
Finally, the 1976 amendment of section 1391(e)6 1 further supports the result
reached in the First Circuit. This amendment permits parties other than
federal officials to be joined, under normal venue rules, in actions under
section 1391(e). 62 Because it would make little sense to involve private citizens
in actions where the relief demanded is mandamus, it appears that Congress
has reaffirmed its intention to allow money damage actions against federal
officials to be brought with the aid of section 1391(e). 63
In summary, the result in Driver seems to comply more with the overall
spirit of the Act, which seeks to make the judicial system more efficient and
more convenient for a private citizen, than does the Second Circuit view,
64
Because the official will be defended either by the local United States Attorney or
by outside counsel retained by the government, 65 it should not be burdensome
for that official or the government to defend the official's actions in a forum
convenient to the plaintiff. Also, the knowledge that section 1391(e), with its
broad venue and service of process provisions, may be applied to the federal
defendant and may result in an out-of-pocket loss to him might deter the official
from a course of action which violates private citizens' constitutional rights. 66
The alternative to permitting the use of section 1391(e) in suits for money
damages is to force aggrieved plaintiffs to incur the high cost of multiple district
litigation .67 Such an occurrence would allow officials to act with impunity by
were used during the hearings. For example, a slander made during the course of the official's
work would be covered, while a claim based on an injury caused by the purely private action of
an off-duty postman would fall outside the purview of § 1391(e). Hearings, supra note 8, at 61-62
(statement of Mr. Drabkin).
60. Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d at 153; see Paley v. Wolk, 262 F. Supp. 640 (N.D. I1. 1965)
(actions of defendant federal officials were purely private and therefore did not come within the
statute), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 963 (1967).
61. See note 5 supra.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), as amended by Act of Oct. 21, 1976, § 3, Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90
Stat. 2721 (1976).
63. Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 154 (Ist Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nora. Colby v.
Driver, 99 S. Ct. 1015 (1979) (No. 78-303); Kipperman v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860, 876 (N.D.
Cal. 1976). But see Blackburn v. Goodwin, No. 78-7592, slip op. at 4667-68 & n.11 (2d Cir. Sept.
10, 1979) (amendment was designed solely to facilitate joinder of parties, other than federal
officials, involved in mandamus controversies).
64. See generally House Report, supra note 5, at 3-4; Senate Report, supra note 5, at 3-4,
reprinted in [1962] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2786-87.
65. 28 C.F.R. § 50.15 (1978); see Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382, 400 & n.22 (D.R.I. 1977),
modified, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nom. Colby v. Driver, 99 S. Ct, 1015
(1979) (No. 78-303); House Report, supra note 5, at 3; Senate Report, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted
in [1962] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2786. It is the policy of the federal government to
defend present or former officials sued for actions taken under color of their authority. In cases In
which conflicts of interest occur, such as when the government is proceeding in a criminal
investigation involving the officials, outside counsel is hired by the government to defend the
officials. 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(a)(5); see 74 F.R.D. at 400 n.22.
66. Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. at 398.
67. Id. at 399. Because the officials would no longer be subject to the expanded venue and
service of process provisions of § 1391(e), the plaintiff would be forced to use § 1391(b), the
general venue statute, which authorizes venue where all defendants reside or where the cause of
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hiding behind a mere venue statute. This would clearly frustrate the con-
gressional purposes behind section 1391(e). 68
H. IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION
The most important issue involved in the interpretation of section 1391(e) is
whether its grant of nationwide service of process 69 gives the district court
automatic personal jurisdiction over the federal official. 70 The Driver court
held that personal jurisdiction is authorized over out-of-state parties when-
ever a statute, such as section 1391(e), provides for service beyond state
action arises. The mail openings involved in this type of litigation often occur far from the
plaintiff's home, and venue in the district where the cause of action arises, therefore, may be
inconvenient. Moreover, because defendants, including the former officials also sued under the
general provisions, may be scattered throughout the country, the plaintiff may not be able to
serve all of them with process from the same district. The plaintiff, as a result, would be forced to
incur the added costs of multiple suits scattered about the country, each one based on the same
set of facts and law. In addition to the added financial burden upon the plaintiff, this situation
would also result in an unnecessary duplication of judicial effort, clearly in contravention of the
Act's goal of judicial economy. See House Report, supra note 5, at 3; Senate Report supra note 5,
at 3, reprinted in [19621 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2786.
68. Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. Department of Hous. & Urban Dev., 284 F.
Supp. 809, 833 (E.D. Pa. 1968) ("Section 1391(e) attempts to remove the virtually impenetrable
barrier of procedural entanglement which has so frequently provided the government with de facto
immunity from law suits").
69. "Nationwide service of process" is a term used to cover a statutory scheme whereby the
plaintiff is permitted to serve process upon the defendant without the normal regard for state
boundaries. See generaUy Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f). The plaintiff may serve the defendant wherever
he is found and need not resort to other statutes in which factual connections, such as contacts
with the forum state, must be proved before the statute can be utilized. Professor Moore has
listed 16 federal statutes that provide for nationwide service of process: (1) 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335,
1397, 2361 (1976) (actions under the federal interpleader act); (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1655 (1976) (actions
to assert rights in property when the defendant cannot be served within the state); (3) 28 U.S.C. §
1695 (1976) (service of process against a corporation in a shareholder's derivative action); (4) IS
U.S.C. § 5 (1976) (action by the United States under the Sherman Act); (5) 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1976)
(action by the United States under the Clayton Act); (6) 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1976) (action against a
corporation under the antitrust laws); (7) 28 U.S.C. § 1692 (1976) (actions concerning land which
lies in more than one district); (8) 28 U.S.C. § 2321 (1976) & 49 U.S.C. §§ 20, 23, 43 (1976)
(actions under the interstate commerce laws); (9) 40 U.S.C. § 270b(b) (1976) (actions brought by
the United States on bonds of public contractors); (10) 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(a), 78aa (1976) (actions
under the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934); (11) 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43
(1976) (actions under the Investment Company Act of 1940); (12) 15 U.S.C. § 79y (1976) (actions
under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935); (13) 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (1976) (actions
under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940); (14) 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1976) (actions to enforce
subpoenas of the Federal Trade Commission); (15) 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1976) (actions to confirm
arbitration awards under the Federal Arbitration Act); (16) 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). See 2 Moore's
Federal Practice 4.42[1], at 4-518 to -523 (2d ed. 1979).
70. The problem of personal jurisdiction is relevant only if a court decides that § 1391(e)
applies to individual actions. If it is found that § 1391(e) applies only to mandamus actions
directed against officials, the jurisdictional problem is less likely to arise. At most, the defendant
will be ordered to carry out an official act, and he will not suffer any out-of-pocket loss. See
Blackburn v. Goodwin, No. 78-7592 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1979).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol, 48
boundaries. 7 1 Such authorization is within the power of Congress, which may
provide for the exercise by the federal courts of personal jurisdiction over any
person having contacts with the United States. 7 2 The First Circuit further
concluded that this particular nationwide service of process provision "[cjlearly
... does more than describe the mechanics of service of process. It creates an
exception to the general rule by allowing service of process anywhere in the
United States by certified mail." 7 3 Because broadened venue could not be
effectuated without broadened service of process, according to this theory, it
followed that such service, without attendant automatic personal jurisdiction,
was insufficient to accomplish Congress' aims. 74 Yet nowhere in the legislative
reports is any express mention made of personal jurisdiction. 7" It seems
incredible that Congress would so broaden an area of civil procedure without
comment. 76 Nevertheless, the First Circuit and many district courts interpreting
section 1391(e) have simply concluded that Congress intended to so broaden
personal jurisdiction. 77
71. Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 155-56 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nom. Colby v.
Driver, 99 S. Ct. 1015 (1979) (No. 78-303).
72. Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. granted sub norn. Stafford v.
Briggs, 99 S. Ct. 1015 (1979) (No. 77-1546). Briggs was a § 1391(e) case which postulated the
existence of only one federal district encompassing the entire United States. Id. at 9; see Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 331 (1816). Because the Constitution provides that "[the
judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such Inferior
Courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish," U.S. Coast, art. III, § 1,
Congress apparently may redraw the existing district lines at any time. In the interest of
convenience to the parties and the witnesses, however, the district lines and the limits of the
federal courts' service have traditionally been determined by state boundaries. 569 F.2d at 9 &
n.72; see J. Goebel, History of the Supreme Court of the United States, Antecedents and
Beginnings to 1801, at 226, 460, 473 (1971); Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal
Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49, 72 (1923). By exercising this power and creating only
one federal district, Congress could necessitate a form of automatic personal jurisdiction because
the federal court would be able to assert personal jurisdiction by service upon the defendant
anywhere within the district of the United States. 569 F.2d at 9-10. If Congress has this power,
the Briggs analysis concluded, it is reasonable to allow it to accomplish the same result through a
statute authorizing nationwide service of process along with an implied grant of automatic
personal jurisdiction. Id. Because the equivalent of automatic personal jurisdiction could be
accomplished in this manner, the Briggs court required little in the way of direct congressional
expression to infer such an intent. Id. at 9; see Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619,
627 (1925).
73. 577 F.2d at 155.
74. Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 156 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nora. Colby v.
Driver, 99 S. Ct. 1015 (1979) (No. 78-303); Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
cert. granted sub non. Stafford v. Briggs, 99 S. Ct. 1015 (1979) (No. 77-1546).
75. See House Report, supra note 5, at 4. In fact, the intent seems to have been "to modify
the service requirements." Id. Moreover, § 1391(e) never mentions personal jurisdiction, but
provides only that the "summons and complaint" may be delivered beyond state lines. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(e) (1976).
76. Blackburn v. Goodwin, No. 78-7592, slip op. at 4670 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1979); Kipperman
v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860, 877 (N.D. Cal. 1976); see Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268
U.S. 619, 627 (1925).
77. Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d at 154-56; see, e.g., Crowley v. United States, 388 F. Supp.
981, 987 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 348 F. Supp. 338,
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The Driver court found a congressional intent to include personal jurisdiction
within the ambit of section 139 1(e)7 8 despite the fact that Congress declined to act
upon a warning from a representative of the Judicial Conference of the United
States that a court using the new statute might have problems obtaining in
personam jurisdiction. 79 When this theory is compared with the same court's
analysis on the subject of individual liability for money damages, a logical
inconsistency is exposed. If Congress' silence when confronted with the
possibility that section 139 1(e) could be used in money damage actions implies its
approval of such a result,80 then does not Congress' silence when confronted with
the information that section 1391(e) might not grant automatic personal
jurisdiction also indicate its approval of that result? If knowledge plus silence
equals intent, then Congress must have intended that section 139 1(e) not be used
as a grant of personal jurisdiction. 8' Either the Driver court did not realize this
inconsistency in its logic or it did not feel burdened to account for it.
Nationwide service of process statutes have generally been construed as
providing the court issuing the process with personal jurisdiction over the
defendant served.8 2 A typical case in this regard is Leasco Data Processing
Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell,5 3 in which the Second Circuit construed section
27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which provides that "process in
such cases [covered by the act] may be served in any other district of which
the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found."8 4 The
court reasoned that "although the section does not deal specifically with in
personam jurisdiction, it is reasonable to infer that Congress meant to assert
364 (W.D. Mo. 1972), aff'd, 477 F.2d 1033 (8th Cir. 1973); English v. Town of Huntington, 335
F. Supp. 1369, 1373 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); Macias v. Finch, 324 F. Supp. 1252, 1254-55 (N.D. Cal.
1970).
78. See 577 F.2d at 155-56.
79. Hearings, supra note 8, at 87 (Judge Maris pointed out that there may be a "problem
about the acquisition of jursidiction in personam by the Court in the venue").
80. See notes 50-56 supra and accompanying text.
81. But see Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d at 155-56.
82. Mariasb v. Morill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1974); Garner v. Enright, 71 F.R.D.
656, 660 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); see Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 156 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. granted
sub nor. Colby v. Driver, 99 S. Ct. 1015 (1979) (No. 78-303); Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 1,
9-10 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. granted sub nomt. Stafford v. Briggs, 99 S. CL 1015 (1979) (No.
77-1546); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1339-40 (2d Cir.
1972). When service of process is nationwide, the only due process requirement is that "the
service authorized by statute must be reasonably calculated to inform the defendant of the
pendancy of the proceedings in order that he may take advantage of the opportunity to be heard
in his defense." Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1974). Thus, "where . . .the
defendants reside within the territorial boundaries of the United States, the 'minimal contacts,'
required to justify the federal government's exercise of power over them, are present. Indeed, the
'minimal contacts' principle does not, in our view, seem particularly relevant in evaluating the
constitutionality of in personam jurisdiction based on nationwide, but not extraterritorial, service
of process." Id. (footnotes omitted).
83. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972). Leasco involved an attempt to exert jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation by means of a nationwide service of process statute. The court applied the
doctrine of minimum contacts with the United States in order to do so. Id. at 1340.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
85. 468 F.2d at 1340; see Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d at 155; Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d at
7-8.
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personal jurisdiction."85 Using a similar analysis, the First Circuit and other
federal courts have found that the second paragraph of section 1391(e), dealing
with the method of service of process, was also intended to supply personal
jurisdiction. 86
The limited judicial opposition8 7 to the Driver view of in personam
jurisdiction centers upon a due process analysis which applies to the federal
district courts the "minimum contacts" test first developed by the Supreme
Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington88 to define the power of
state long-arm jurisdiction.99 This theory requires that a defendant official
have such contacts with the forum district before section 1391(e) can be held
to confer jurisdiction.9" This analysis, however, ignores the fact that the
jurisdictional power of a federal district court is based not upon the power of
the state in which the court sits but upon the sovereignty of the United
States. 9 1 All that due process requires, therefore, is that the defendant have
86. See Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 156-57 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nora. Colby
v. Driver, 99 S. Ct. 1015 (1979) (No. 78-303); Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 1, 7-10 (D.C. Cir.
1977), cert. .granted sub non. Stafford v. Briggs, 99 S. Ct. 1015 (1979) (No. 77-1546); Misko v.
United States, 77 F.R.D. 425, 427 (D.D.C. 1978); United States v. MeAninch, 435 F. Supp. 240,
244 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Crowley v. United States, 388 F. Supp. 981, 987 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Rlmar
v. McCowan, 374 F. Supp. 1179, 1181 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Froehlke, 348 F. Supp. 338, 364 (W.D. Mo. 1972), aff'd, 477 F.2d 1033 (8th Cir. 1973). Several
of these cases go into a detailed analysis for their holdings that nationwide service of process also
provides personal jurisdiction. See Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d at 154-57; Briggs v. Goodwin, 569
F.2d at 7-10. Other cases, however, merely provide conclusory statements with no apparent basis
in authority. See, e.g., Misko v. United States, 77 F.R.D. at 427 (nationwide service of process
"not only authorizes a particular manner of service, but speaks to general amenability to service,
i.e. in personam jurisdiction"). Crowley v. United States, 388 F. Supp. at 987 (conclusion without
citations); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 348 F. Supp. at 364 ("Itlhis Court has
jurisdiction of the persons of the two individual federal defendants by virtue of 28 United States
Code § 1391(e)").
87. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Rudick v. Laird, 412 F.2d 16, 20 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 918 (1969); Kipperman v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860, 871-75 (N.D. Cal. 1976); United
States ex rel. Armstrong v. Wheeler, 321 F. Supp. 471, 477 (E.D. Pa. 1970). The holdings In
Rudick and Armstrong, both habeas corpus cases, are questionable in light of the Supreme
Court's holding in Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487, 490 n.4 (1971), that habeas corpus actions
are not "civil actions" for purposes of § 1391(e).
88. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
89. The International Shoe test seeks to ensure that the Fourteenth Amendment's require-
ment of basic "fairness" is met when a state court asserts personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state
defendant. Id. at 316; see Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251-53 (1958); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
Minimum contacts, and therefore by definition the "fairness" which the Fourteenth Amendment
requires, are present when the defendant performs "some act by which [it] purpose[lyl avails Itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253. Thus, for a state court to assert
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, such an assertion must comport with "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at
316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
90. United States ex rel. Rudick v. Laird, 412 F.2d 16, 20 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
918 (1969); Kipperman v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860, 871 (N.D. Cal. 1976); United States ex rel.
Armstrong v. Wheeler, 321 F. Supp. 471, 476-78 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
91. Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1974); Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382,
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some contacts with the United States;92 such contacts are obvious when the
defendant is an official of the federal government.
A sounder justification for the view that section 1391(e) does not supply
automatic personal jurisdiction is based not upon due process but upon the
discrepancies between section 1391(e) and the remaining nationwide service of
process statutes. These statutes either have venue provisions related to the
residence of the defendant or determine venue according to section 1391(b),
the general venue statute. 93 For example, section 27 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, construed in Leasco, provides that suit may be brought
where the defendant resides or does business, or where the cause of action has
arisen. 94 By determining venue in these terms Congress has traditionally
390-91 (D.R.I. 1977), modified, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nom. Colby v.
Driver, 99 S. Ct. 1015 (1979) (No. 78-303). Therefore, a federal court's service of process may
constitutionally transcend state lines, and the court may assert jurisdiction over any person within
the United States. Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619 (1925); Briggs v. Goodwin,
569 F.2d 1, 8-10 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. granted sub nor. Stafford v. Briggs, 99 S. Ct. 1015 (1979)
(No. 77-1546); Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. at 389-401; see 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1126, at 529 (1969). Although contacts with the district play no part
in 'he determination of federal jurisdiction, they may become a consideration on a motion for
transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). See notes 106-14 infra and accompanying text.
92. See Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1974); Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1339 (2d Cir. 1972).
93. In lien enforcement actions against absent defendants, venue is proper in the district
where the property is situated. 28 U.S.C. § 1655 (1976). See, e.g., Dick v. Foraker, 155 U.S. 404
(1894) (predecessor section applied only when the land against which the lien was applied was in
the district where the suit had originated); Fabian v. Kennedy, 333 F. Supp. 1001 (N.D. W.Va.
1971) (iection is applicable only when the suit is in rem and not in personam against the
defendant for money damages). In shareholder derivative actions, process may be served where
the corporation is organized, licensed to do business or doing business. 28 U.S.C. § 1695 (1976).
See, e.g., Norte & Co. v. Huffines, 222 F. Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), appeal dismissed sub nor.
Norte & Co. v. Defiance Indus. Inc., 319 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1963) (service quashed where
corporation was organized elsewhere, did no business in the district, and no defendant resided in
the district); Clay v. Thomas, 185 F. Supp. 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (venue for the action must still
be laid pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1401). In actions for injunctions under the antitrust laws, the
court, in its discretion, can bring in non-resident defendants when "the ends of justice require
that other parties should be brought before the court." 15 U.S.C. §§ 5, 25 (1976). See, e.g.,
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (if one co-conspirator is present in the
district, it justifies the courts decision to draw in the other co-conspirators). In antitrust actions,
suit must be brought in the state of incorporation, or where the corporation is found or transacts
business. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1976). See, e.g., San Antonio Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 364
F. Supp. 1157 (W.D. Tex. 1973, aff'd 499 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1974) (section is not intended to
give plaintiffs the unlimited right to choose venue); Albert Levine Assoc. v. Bertoni & Cotti, 314
F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (general venue provisions still apply to actions where the
defendant is served under this section); Chemical Specialties Sales Corp.-Indus. Div. v. Basic
Inc., 296 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Conn. 1968) (nationwide service is provided only after all venue
provisions are met). In actions under the Federal Interpleader Act, venue is proper where one or
more claimants reside. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (1976). See, e.g., Marine Bank & Trust Co. v.
Hamilton Bros., Inc., 55 F.R.D. 505 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (sections should not be used as a tool to
expand the jurisdictional drawing power of a court over non-residents).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976). "Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by
this chapter or rules and regulations thereunder... may be brought.., in the district wherein
the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business. . . ." Id.
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ensured-out of fairness, not out of constitutional necessity 95-that the suit
would be brought in a forum district with which the defendant has had some
minimum contact.
In section 1391(e), however, Congress has dispensed with the usual focus
upon the defendant and has instead created venue wherever the plaintiff
resides. 96 When this broad venue provision is combined with the ability to
serve process nationwide, the inherent guarantee of some degree of fairness
through minimum contacts, present in typical nationwide service of process
statutes, is eliminated. For example, a plaintiff who is injured in New York
and subsequently moves to Alaska may force a federal official, in his
individual capacity, to answer to suit in Alaska, even thought the official had
no hint that his actions would eventually subject him to possible personal
liability in that state or part of the country. 97 In effect, such a situation
unduly discriminates against federal officials who are sued individually and
who must pay any judgment out of their own pockets. There is little
difference between the federal official sued individually and a private defen-
dant, yet the private defendant has the privilege of being sued where he
resides, while a federal defendant must travel to the plaintiffs residence. 98
In the aforementioned hypothetical, all the parties and witnesses may be
located in another section of the country, save one single plaintiff; such was
the case in Driver.99 It is difficult to see, therefore, how the First Circuit's
interpretation of the statute conforms to the notions of judicial efficiency and
economy expressed in the House and Senate reports. 100 In fact, the Driver
view seems to work against these goals. Although the plaintiffs burden is
eased, there is a potential for abuse which may work undue hardship upon
the defendants, witnesses, and even co-plaintiffs.
Because of the lack of focus on the defendant in section 1391(e), it is
arguable that the requisite intent to create an automatic personal jurisdiction
statute is not present. In the past, the Supreme Court has stated that intent
is not to be lightly assumed when Congress is departing from longstanding
tradition. 1 1 First, as evidenced by its language, section 1391(e) seems to
apply only to the method of service of process and not to the defendant's
amenability to process:
The summons and complaint in such an action shall be served as provided by the
)5. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 1, 8-10 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. granted sub nora.
Stafford v. Briggs, 99 S. Ct. 1015 (1979) (No. 77-1546).
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(4) (1976).
97. Cf. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (although the defendant
never actually did business in California, his actions were calculated to achieve results there).
98. Hearings, supra note 8, at 62 (statement of Mr. MacGuineas); see Blackburn v. Goodwin,
No. 78-7592, slip op. at 4669-70 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1979).
99. 577 F.2d at 149 & nn.2, 3 (the 25 defendants were all non-residents of Rhode Island, as
were all but one of the plaintiffs; the alleged violations took place in New York City); see
Kipperman v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
100. House Report, supra note 5, at 3; Senate Report, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in [1962]
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2786.
101. Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 627 (1925); see In re East River Towing
Co., 266 U.S. 355, 367 (1924); Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 384 (1924); United States
v. Barnes, 222 U.S. 513, 520 (1912).
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure except that the delivery of the summons and
complaint to the officer or agency as required by the rules may be made by certified
mail beyond the territorial limits of the district in which the action is brought.102
This language differs substantially from the usual language of such statutes,
which call for service wherever the defendant is found. 10 3 In contrast, section
1391(e) is more specific in speaking to method rather than amenability of
service. Second, when this practical difference between section 1391(e) and
other nationwide service statutes is uncovered and it is obvious that Congress
has not merely followed established legal patterns but has in fact broken
completely new ground by basing venue upon the location of a single plaintiff,
inferences concerning congressional intent should not be made without strong
evidence. The conclusions drawn by the First Circuit in Driver, overlooking
statutory discrepancies, are conclusory at best. With the intent of Congress
anything but "unmistakeably expressed,"' 0 4 therefore, such conclusions are
clearly unwarranted. 0 5
In cases in which the courts have nevertheless found automatic personal
jurisdiction, one might expect, given the discriminatory effect of this basic
difference between section 1391(e) and other statutes, a large number of
requests for transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which provides that
"[flor the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a
district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division
where it might have been brought.' 0 6 Such transfers, however, have not
occurred.' 0 7 Even in Driver, an action in which not one defendant and only
one plaintiff had any contacts with the District of Rhode Island, transfer was
considered but rejected on the ground that "officers of the federal government
are different from private defendants because they can anticipate that their
official acts may affect people in every part of the United States."' 08
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1976) (emphasis added).
103. See, e.g., Securities & Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976) (process "may
be served... wherever the defendant may be found"); Investment Company Act of 1940. § 44, 15
U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1976) (same).
104. "On traditional canons of interpretation, the intention of the framers being unmistake-
ably expressed, that intention is as good as written into the text." R. Berger, Government by
Judiciary 7 (1977).
105. It has been suggested that policy decisions are for the legislature; policing of constitu-
tional boundaries is for the courts. Id. at 355. In the instant situation the prudent course may well
be to interpret the statute narrowly and defer to Congress for future clarification.
106. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976).
107. Of all the § 1391(e) cases cited herein, transfer was considered only in Driver v. Helms,
577 F.2d at 157, and Relf v. Gasch, 511 F.2d 804, 806-08 (D.C. Cir. 197S). In Driver, the
appellants argued that creation of automatic personal jurisdiction was unfair to them because it
created a harsher burden upon the officials than on private litigants. The court recognized this,
stating that their best remedy was transfer under § 1404(a). Transfer, however, was denied
because, as government officials, they should have expected that their actions would have
far-reaching effects. 577 F.2d at 157. In Relf, a case holding that § 1391(e) does not create
automatic personal jurisdiction, the court found that the transferee district would not have had
personal jurisdiction in the original action; transfer, therefore, could not have been granted. 511
F.2d at 806-08; see 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976).
108. 577 F.2d at 157.
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In categorically rejecting transfer, the First Circuit apparently overlooked
evidence in the unpublished hearings on the predecessor bill to section 1391(e)
which indicates that Congress not only intended the section 1404(a) right of
transfer to be available to defendants in section 1391(e) actions, but saw such
transfers as the obvious remedy to the potential abuses involved in these
actions. 10 9 This evidence clearly undercuts any argument that in a conflict
between the two sections, section 1391(e), as a "plaintiffs' provision,""10
should prevail. Moreover, such an argument against the use of section 1404(a)
would not comport with the stated objectives of convenience and judicial
efficiency expressed in the legislative reports."' Section 1404(a) satisfies these
objectives by leaving the transfer question in the discretion of the court.1 12
109. Hearings, supra note 8, at 24-25 (statement of judge Mars). Although a primary consid-
eration was to allow an action to be brought in a forum convenient for the plaintiff and tile
witnesses and in a forum where the presiding judge would have some special knowledge concern-
ing the factual background of the suit, for example actions concerning real property, the wisdom
of allowing the plaintiff to bring the action where he resided was questioned. Id. In analyzing this
problem, Rep. Ray propounded a hypothetical concerning a plaintiff who resided in California,
but also held grazing permits for land he owned in Montana. An action brought under § 1391(e)'s
predecessor could conceivably have been brought in California and not Montana (§ 1391(e)
bypassed this problem by permitting venue where the plaintiff resided only when there was no
real property involved in the action), where all the litigated events actually took place. Thus, the
total effect of the statute would have been to move the action from Washington, D.C. to Califor-
nia, still leaving all the witnesses and property in Montana. Id. at 16. Judge Mars then assured
the congressional committee that if such a situation occurred, the court would be able to transfer
the action to a more appropriate forum. Id. at 26. He stated: "We have the statute on the books
now which authorizes the District Court in the interest of justice and for the convenience of the
parties to transfer a case from one venue to another. You are familiar with that statute, section
1404(a) of title 28. That would apply here, too. So that the Government would still have the
opportunity, if a case were really brought in a place that was going to be oppressive to the
administration of justice, to ask the Court of that place to transfer the case to the District of
Columbia or some other place. It would be completely within the power of the District Judge to
see that the case was ultimately lodged in a District which was appropriate and convenient as
nearly as might be to all parties." Id. at 26. Furthermore, "[a] defendant will still not be precluded
from making his motion for the change of venue to a more convenient forum under this
proposal." Id. at 58. (statement of Rep. Whitener). Therefore, even though the statute was
subsequently restricted to provide venue where the plaintiff resides only when no real property Is
involved in the action, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(4), transfer must still be carefully considered by
the court.
110. Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. Department of Hous. & Urban Dev., 284 F.
Supp. 809, 833 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
111. House Report, supra note 5, at 3; Senate Report, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in [19621
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2786.
112. See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 342 (1960); Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight, 181
F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1950); 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976); 7B Moore's Federal Practice § 1404, at
JC-603 to -610 (2d ed. 1979). Although in Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), the
Supreme Court held that "unless the balance [of factors in the transfer decision] is strongly In
favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed," the Court also
held that the decision was always in the discretion of the trial court. Id. at 508. The Court then
went on to list some of the appropriate considerations for such a decision, including the plaintiff's
initial choice of forum, the ease of access to sources of proof, the availability of compulsory
process for bringing in unwilling witnesses, the cost of bringing in such witnesses, and "all other
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive." Id. In Driver, It
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The fact that section 1391(e) was designed to aid plaintiffs, therefore, should
be a factor in the trial court's decision but should not be allowed to bar
transfers under section 1404(a) when expedient to the interests of justice.' 3
The transfer of actions based upon factual situations similar to Driver is an
option which all federal defendants should explore fully and one which all
judges, given the peculiar nature of the statute, must consider. In the event
that a court chooses to create automatic personal jurisdiction, the unique
nature of section 1391(e) opens the way for serious abuses."14 Transfer
appears to be the best solution to curb these abuses.
CONCLUSION
The full potential of section 1391(e) is only now being realized. As more and
more private citizens become aware of possible past infringements of their
constitutional rights, the use of section 1391(e) in actions similar to Driver will
certainly escalate. It is imperative, therefore, that the scope of the section be
resolved to enable potential plaintiffs against federal officials to balance cost
factors against the probability of success. Moreover, a construction in which
the federal official is subjected to the maximum effects of section 1391(e)
would have a beneficial effect in that officials might be more aware of their
potential liability and restrict their activities accordingly.
Based upon the available evidence, Driver's holding that section 1391(e)
should be applicable to actions for money damages seems correct. The
rationale for creating automatic personal jurisdiction, however, is not as
convincing. Section 1391(e) is not a carbon copy of other nationwide service of
process statutes; rather, it is an unprecedented deviation from the general
venue rules, which have traditionally required at least a minimal tether
between the defendant and the forum court. In light of this deviation, the
sufficient congressional intent to find a grant of automatic personal jurisdic-
tion is lacking. Section 1391(e) is essentially designed to provide only a
method of service of process.
would have been difficult to say that for any of the parties except Driver, the Rhode Island venue
was easy, expeditious or inexpensive.
113. Another argument against the creation of automatic personal jurisdiction and for the
proposition of transfer is the discrimination § 1391(e) works against federal defendants. As Mr.
MacGuineas noted. "[jf that judgment is rendered against that defendant [sued in his individual
capacity], he pays out of his own pocket and then if you are going to say that in that case the
Government official must be sued in the plaintiff's district, you discriminate against him in favor
of every other citizen because the other citizen who is sued for slander-I am talking about two
private citizens now who are in suit-the defendant in that case has the privilege of demanding
that suit be brought in his district. . . . Now, wouldn't it raise serious policy questions if a bill
were enacted which would discriminate against Government officials and deny them the same
kind of venue privileges which every other citizen of this country has when he is made a
defendant in a lawsuit." Hearings, supra note 8, at 62-63; see Blackburn v. Goodwin, No.
78-7592, slip op. at 4669-70 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1979). This problem of subjecting a federal
defendant to such discriminatory treatment has never been squarely faced by the courts. While
this treatment should not invalidate the statute, it is a factor to be considered in any transfer
decision.
114. Hearings, supra note 8, at 25, 62 (statements of Judge Mfais, Mr. MacGuineas); see note
109 supra.
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Finally, the possibility of transfer should be considered by all participants
in a section 1391(e) action. Although Driver involved a situation in which there
were no contacts with the district, it is possible that its facts were not
sufficiently extreme to justify transfer.115 Driver, however, exposes the po-
tential abuses which defendants may encounter when they are sued in their
individual capacities pursuant to section 139.1(e). While Congress' attempt to
make federal officials more accountable to the public through section 1391(e)
is reasonable, the statute's discriminatory side effects require a narrow
interpretation in the Supreme Court.
Frederick H. McGrath
115. While Rhode Island is relatively proximate to Washington, D.C. and a forum there
might not prove to be a hardship on an official actively involved in the government's defense of his
private wealth, venue in the hypothetical posed in the text at note 97 might cause problems for tile
same official. See Hearings, supra note 8, at 16-17 (statements of Rep. Budge supporting proposal to
limit venue to district where cause of action arises).
